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Summary
Ukraine may be at a key period in its transition that could shape its geopolitical
orientation for years to come, in part due to presidential elections held on October 31
and November 21, 2004.  Ukraine could move closer to integration in Euro-Atlantic
institutions, real democracy and the rule of law, and a genuine free market economy,
or it could move toward a Russian sphere of influence, with “managed democracy”
and an oligarchic economy.  Ukraine’s political scene has been dominated by
President Leonid Kuchma and the oligarchic “clans” (regionally based groups of
powerful politicians and businessmen) that have supported  him.  The oligarchs chose
Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych as their candidate to succeed Kuchma as
President. The chief opposition candidate, former Prime Minister Viktor
Yushchenko, is a pro-reform, pro-Western figure seen by many observers as a man
of high personal integrity.
International observers criticized the election campaign and both rounds of the
election as not free and fair, citing such factors as government-run media bias in
favor of Yanukovych, abuse of absentee ballots, barring of opposition representatives
from electoral commissions,  inaccurate voter lists, official pressure on students and
government and private sector workers to vote for Yanukovych, and falsified vote
counts.  Nevertheless, Yushchenko topped the first round of the vote on October 31
by a razor-thin margin over Yanukovych.  Other candidates finished far behind.
After the November 21 runoff between the two top candidates, Ukraine’s Central
Election Commission proclaimed Yanukovych the winner.  Yushchenko’s supporters
charged that massive fraud had been committed.  They blockaded government offices
in Kiev and appealed to the Ukrainian Supreme Court to invalidate the vote as
fraudulent.  The court did so on December 3, calling for a repeat of the second round
on December 26. 
The European Union and the United States strongly denounced electoral fraud
in Ukraine, and backed the Ukrainian Supreme Court’s call for a repeat vote.  In
contrast, Russian President Vladimir Putin openly backed Yanukovych and publicly
congratulated him on his “victory” soon after the second round vote.  Russian
officials have charged that the United States and the European Union’s charges of
electoral fraud are an attempt to bring Ukraine under western influence.  U.S.
policymakers must tackle such difficult issues as how to promote democracy in
Ukraine while also dealing with such problems such as the impact of the crisis on
Ukraine’s foreign policy orientation, its troop commitment to Iraq, and U.S.-Russian
tensions over the Ukraine crisis. 
Congress has adopted legislation on the Ukrainian elections. S.Con.Res.106 and
H.Con.Res. 415 call on Ukraine to end violations of democratic standards and hold
free and fair elections. S.Res. 473 raises these issues and calls on the President to
consider sanctions against Ukrainian leaders if they improperly influence the
outcome of the election.  For more on Ukraine, see CRS Report RL30984, Ukraine’s
Future and U.S. Policy Issues.  This report will be updated as needed.
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1  Ukraine became part of the Russian Empire in the late 1600s, experienced a brief period
of independence at the end of the First World War, was reconquered by Soviet armies, and
was a republic of the Soviet Union from 1922 until the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. in
December 1991.  Eastern Ukraine is heavily industrialized, with a large defense industrial
sector and large, though inefficient, coal and steel industries.  Ukraine’s industries are
closely integrated with those of Russia.  The population of eastern Ukraine is also said to
be substantially “Russified.”  It has a substantial population of ethnic Russians and most of
the ethnic Ukrainian population in the east speaks Russian as their first language.  Western
and central Ukraine are more agricultural, and Ukrainian nationalism is more prominent
there.
Ukraine’s Political Crisis: Ukrainian
Presidential Elections and U.S. Policy
Ukraine’s Political Transition
Ukraine may be at a key period in its transition that could shape its geopolitical
orientation for years to come, in part due to presidential elections held on October 31
and November 21, 2004.  Ukraine could move closer to integration in Euro-Atlantic
institutions, real democracy and the rule of law, and a genuine free market economy,
or it could move toward a Russian sphere of influence, with a “managed democracy”
and an oligarchic economy.  
Ukraine, comparable in size and population to France, is a large, important
European state in its own right.1  The fact that it occupies the sensitive position
between Russia and new NATO member states Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and
Romania, adds to its geostrategic significance regionally and for the United States.
Many Russian politicians, as well as ordinary citizens, have never been fully
reconciled to Ukraine’s independence in 1991.  Russian nationalists in particular
view a (re)union with Ukraine as highly desirable, natural, and virtually inevitable.
The U.S. and European view, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, is that a
strong, independent Ukraine is an important source of regional stability. 
Ukraine’s political scene has been dominated by President Leonid Kuchma and
the oligarchic “clans” (regionally-based groups of powerful politicians and
businessmen) that have supported  him.  Kuchma was elected President in 1994, and
re-elected in 1999.  He cannot run for a third term under the Ukrainian constitution.
His rule has been characterized by fitful economic reform (albeit with solid economic
growth in recent years), widespread corruption, and a deteriorating human rights
record.  The oligarchs chose Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, a representative of
the powerful Donetsk clan in eastern Ukraine, as their candidate to succeed Kuchma
as President. During the campaign, Yanukovych and other Ukrainian government
leaders called for closer ties with Moscow and downplayed the prospects for NATO
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2 In November 2000, an audio tape provided by a former bodyguard of Ukrainian President
Kuchma purportedly captured Kuchma’s orders to top officials to neutralize independent
journalist Georgiy Gongadze, whose headless, mutilated body had been found by police.
Kuchma’s alleged involvement in this murder is seen by some as a key factor in
undermining his public support and credibility in Ukraine.  CRS Report RL30984, Ukraine’s
Future and U.S. Policy Issues, p. 1.
membership and Euro-Atlantic integration for the foreseeable future.  Yanukovych
supporters also used anti-American themes in their campaign.
 The chief opposition candidate, former Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko, is
a pro-reform and pro-Western figure seen by many observers as a man of high
personal integrity.  The current regime reportedly fears that Yushchenko could move
to clean up corruption if elected, which could expose Kuchma and other current
leaders to criminal prosecution. The oligarchs could also lose property acquired
through privatizations of dubious legality, some occurring in the weeks and months
leading up to the vote.
Electoral Campaign Conditions
U.S. and international officials have expressed concern about the lack of press
freedom in Ukraine. Almost all major broadcast media are under tight control of the
government or of businessmen with close ties to the government. Government-
controlled broadcast and press outlets engaged in biased reporting in favor of
Yanukovych, while Yushchenko was sharply criticized, according to a long-term
observer mission from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE).  Independent print media and the few independent broadcast outlets express
a wide variety of views, but Ukrainian journalists have been subject to harassment
and, in some cases, violence.2  Independent media have been subject to selective tax
audits, libel suits, pressure on printing and distribution, and refusal to renew
broadcasting licenses.  
According to most international observers, Ukrainian authorities violated
standards for free and fair elections in other ways during the campaign.  OSCE
observers noted in reports in September and October 2004 that government
employees, factory workers and students were threatened with dismissal unless they
supported Yanukovych.  Opposition efforts to hold election rallies were hampered
at times by government harassment. In early September 2004, Yushchenko accused
the authorities of trying to poison him. On September 6, Yushchenko fell seriously
ill, shortly after attending a dinner with the chief of the Ukrainian security services.
After his condition worsened, he was rushed to a medical clinic in Austria. Doctors
were unable to determine the cause of the illness.  Yushchenko soon resumed
campaigning, but his health remained fragile and his face is severely pockmarked.
Over 3,500 election observers registered to monitor the October 31 vote,
according to Ukrainian officials.  These included a group of 600 observers from the
OSCE.  Other institutions represented included the Council of Europe, the
International Republican Institute, the National Democratic Institute, Freedom
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3 For the official results of the elections, see the website of the Ukrainian Central Election
Commission, [http://ic2-www.cvk.gov.ua/wp0011e].
4 For the texts of the OSCE observation mission reports on the Ukrainian elections, see the
OSCE website, [http://www.osce.org].
House, the World Congress of Ukrainians, and the Commonwealth of Independent
States.  A similarly large number of international observers were present for the
second round of the election on November 21.  Ukrainian law does not provide for
domestic non-partisan election observers, a serious shortcoming, according to the
OSCE.
Election Results
On November 10, after a substantial delay, the Ukrainian Central Election
Commission announced the final results of the first round of the election.  According
to the CEC, Yushchenko won 39.87% of the vote, while Yanukovych won 39.32%.
Socialist Party leader Oleksandr Moroz won 5.81%, and Communist Party leader
Petro Symonenko received 4.97% of the vote.  The remaining 20 candidates split the
remaining vote.  According to Ukrainian law, since no candidate received 50% of the
vote, the top two finishers, Yanukovych and Yushchenko, moved on to a November
21 runoff election.  The distribution of the first round vote broke down sharply along
regional lines, with the more nationally-oriented western and central Ukraine
supporting Yushchenko and the more Russified eastern and southern Ukraine
supporting Yanukovych. For example, Yanukovych won 86.94% in his home region
of Donetsk, while Yushchenko received only 2.94%.  In the Lviv region in western
Ukraine, Yushchenko won 87.25%, while Yanukovych won 5.81%.  Turnout for the
first round was an impressive 74.95%.3
International observers from the OSCE criticized the first round of the election,
saying that it fell short of international democratic practices in several respects.  The
observers noted problems in the campaign including heavy media bias, use of
government resources on behalf of Yanukovych, and government interference with
opposition campaign events.  Observers noted significant problems on election day,
including a large number of names missing from voting rolls and the last-minute
barring of some members of local electoral commissions from their posts.4   Pointing
to exit polls and a parallel vote count conducted by the opposition, the Yushchenko
campaign charged that widespread government fraud and intimidation denied
Yushchenko a large lead over Yanukovych, perhaps even outright victory in the first
round.   Despite these concerns, Yushchenko said that he was prepared to go forward
with the second round of voting on November 21.  
On November 24, the Ukrainian Central Election Commission announced that
Yanukovych had won the second round with 49.46% of the vote, with Yushchenko
receiving 46.61%.  Turnout for the election was said to be 80.85%. Yushchenko’s
supporters charged that massive fraud had been committed.  They pointed to exit
polls that showed a victory for Yushchenko by a comfortable margin, as well as
improbable turnout figures in Yanukovych strongholds, including 96.65% in the
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Donetsk region.  The officially reported second round results showed the same
regional split as the first round, with Yushchenko winning overwhelmingly in
western and central Ukraine and Yanukovych winning by massive margins in eastern
and southern Ukraine.5
Election observers from the OSCE again said that the conduct of the runoff was
not consistent with democratic standards.  Fraudulent practices noted by international
observers included abuse of absentee ballots, abuse of mobile ballot boxes, expulsion
of opposition representatives from electoral commissions, violence against media
representatives, inaccurate voter lists, and official pressure on students and
government and private sector workers to vote for Yanukovych.  The Yushchenko
campaign also provided what it called tape-recorded evidence of systematic, large-
scale fraud in the vote count.  
Ukraine’s Political Crisis
On November 22, after preliminary results favoring Yanukovych were
published, Yushchenko claimed victory in the election, and his supporters warned
that they would launch court challenges, massive, non-violent street protests and
other forms of civil disobedience to overturn the fraudulent result.  On November 23,
Yushchenko, in a symbolic move, took the oath of office of the President of Ukraine
in the parliament chamber, while as many as 200,000 Yushchenko supporters
demonstrated outside the building.  Tens of thousands attended protests in other
Ukrainian cities, mainly in western Ukraine.  The government of the capital, Kiev,
as well as the cities of Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Vynntsia, and Ternopil in western
Ukraine announced that they would recognize only Yushchenko as President.
On November 25, the Ukranian Supreme Court blocked official publication of
the election result, the last step required before the winning candidate can be
inaugurated, pending its consideration of Yushchenko’s fraud charges. On November
27, the Ukrainian parliament approved a resolution calling the election invalid and
passed a vote of no confidence in the Central Election Commission.  Although
neither of these votes is binding on the government, they denoted that the pro-regime
majority in the parliament was fragmenting or bending to popular pressure, and
represented a serious blow to the regime’s prestige.  On December 1, the parliament
took the further step of adopting a motion of no-confidence in the Yanukovych
government, which required Kuchma to decide whether to keep Yanukovych as the
head of a caretaker government or appoint someone else. 
Another indication of the erosion of the regime’s support after the second round
vote has been the refusal of journalists at pro-government broadcast stations to
continue to follow regime guidelines on coverage. They have provided more
balanced coverage of opposition leaders and the massive opposition demonstrations
in Kiev.  The opposition has kept the pressure up on the regime by holding massive
rallies in Kiev, in which hundreds of thousands of people have participated, and by
peacefully blockading the parliament and government office buildings.  In the face
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of these massive protests, Prime Minister Yanukovych left Kiev and retreated to his
power base in Eastern Ukraine.
It was unclear at first whether Ukrainian internal security forces or the army
would obey possible orders to use violence against protesters.  A statement by the
Ukrainian prosecutor general, the interior ministry and the security services on
November 22 warned that they would put an end to any “lawlessness” by the
opposition “quickly and firmly.”  On the other hand, the Defense Minister and the
head of the Ukrainian security service said that they would not issue orders to use
force against protesters. The leading posts in Ukraine’s internal security services are
deemed by analysts to be held by supporters of an oligarchic group led by Ukrainian
Presidential Administration chief Viktor Medvedchuk.  However, the large number
of people that Yushchenko managed to turn out into the streets appeared to give the
regime pause.  Moreover, it appears that Yushchenko and his supporters have made
substantial inroads in persuading rank-and-file police not to obey orders to use force
against protestors.  A December 14 report in the Financial Times cited Western
intelligence reports, Yuri Baziv, deputy head of the Presidential Administration, and
others as saying that Yanukovych and Medvedchuk urged President Kuchma to use
force against the demonstrators on November 28 but that Kuchma refused.
The massing of several hundred thousand ardent Yushchenko supporters in
Kiev’s Independence Square and the continuation of this “people power” pressure on
the government for two weeks was extraordinary in several respects.  The
demonstrators remained peaceful and well disciplined throughout.  Extensive
logistical support was put in place very quickly to support the mass demonstrations.
These efforts testify not only to the determination of the demonstrators, but suggest
strong leadership and advanced planning, preparation, and training as well.
Perhaps fearful of the regime’s loss of control of the situation in Kiev, on
November 29 officials from 17 regional governments in southern and eastern Ukraine
met in Yanukovych’s eastern Ukraine power base and adopted a resolution warning
that their regions would seek autonomy within Ukraine if Yushchenko becomes
President. The regional legislature in Donetsk, Yanukovych’s home region,
announced that it would hold a referendum on December 9 on autonomy for the
region.
On December 3, the Ukrainian Supreme Court ruled that the second round of
the election was invalid, due to vote fraud.  It called for a repeat vote of the second
round to be held on December 26.  The court’s decision marked a major victory for
Yushchenko.  However, subsequent negotiations between the parties over how to
implement the decision proved difficult.  Yushchenko wanted Kuchma to dismiss the
Yanukovych government and the Central Electoral Commission, which oversaw the
fraudulent vote.  He also wanted the Ukrainian parliament to pass changes to
electoral legislation to eliminate the methods used by the authorities to falsify the
previous vote.  
For his part, President Kuchma Kuchma resisted dismissing the Yanukovych
government.  He granted Yanukovych’s request for a temporary leave of absence
from his post during the campaign for the repeat vote.  Kuchma and regime loyalists
in parliament said that they would support election law changes and dismissing the
CRS-6
Central Election Commission only if the parliament approved amendments to the
Ukrainian constitution to reduce the powers of the presidency and increase those of
parliament and the prime minister.   The move served to split anti-regime forces in
the parliament.  The Socialists, who favor Yushchenko, also strongly support the
amendments.  The Communists, who rejected both candidates in the second round,
also advocate these political reforms.  
On December 8, the Ukranian parliament agreed on a package of measures
aimed at ending the political crisis.  The parliament approved changes to the election
law to reduce the chances of electoral fraud in the December 26 revote. The
parliament dismissed the Central Election Commission and approved a new
commission.  A majority of the new members were proposed by pro-Yushchenko
groups.  In contrast, the candidacies of the former chairman of the commission and
supporters of Yanukovych were all voted down.     
The parliament also overwhelmingly approved political reforms reducing the
powers of the presidency, which will go into effect in September 2005 if a new law
on local government is passed and in January 2006 if it is not.   Under the reform, the
Cabinet of Ministers will be the supreme executive body in Ukraine.  The President
will have the power to nominate the prime minister, the foreign minister, and the
defense minister, subject to the approval of parliament.  The rest of the government
is nominated by the prime minister and approved by the parliament.  The President
will retain the power to appoint governors in Ukraine’s regions.   
The passage of this reform package may signal that power in Ukraine is already
starting to shift toYushchenko, making his election to the presidency increasingly
likely. The pro-regime majority in the parliament, which appeared increasingly shaky
during the crisis, appears to be falling apart, with many former regime loyalists either
drifting toward Yushchenko or adopting a more neutral stance.  Kuchma’s shift from
support of Yanukovych to his support for the reform package also demonstrates the
lack of solidarity among senior regime leaders.  Yanukovych sharply criticized the
reform package, saying that he doubted the new vote would be free and fair, given
that he now has no representatives on the CEC.  He added that he felt that Kuchma
had betrayed him.  Other symptoms of regime weakness in the wake of the passage
of the reforms included the resignation of Prosecutor General Hennadii Vasyliev,
who the opposition claimed abused his office to support the regime, and Presidential
Administration chief Viktor Medvedchuk, suspected of directing past efforts at
electoral fraud and conducting numerous “dirty tricks” against regime opponents.
On December 11, doctors at Austria’s Rudolfinerhaus clinic, who treated
Yushchenko for his mysterious illness during the election campaign, confirmed that
Yushchenko had been poisoned with the toxic substance dioxin.  After the report, the
parliament and government prosecutors reopened their inquiry into the case.
Yushchenko has called for the investigation to be put off until after the vote, so as to
not unduly influence the campaign.  However, observers note that the report is likely






During the campaign, President Putin and other Russian leaders made many
statements in support of Yanukovych.  A large number of Russian political
consultants associated with the Kremlin advised Yanukovych’s campaign.  U.S.
officials have said that there are “credible reports” that Russia supplied large sums
to the Yanukovych campaign.  President Putin visited Ukraine just before each of the
two rounds of the vote and praised the achievements of Yanukovych’s government.
In contrast to Western concerns about the election, Russian President Putin pointedly
congratulated Yanukovych on his alleged victory in the second round of what Putin
called a fair election, even before the official vote count was announced.6 
Russian officials have strongly condemned Western and OSCE charges of
electoral fraud as interference in Ukraine’s internal affairs and motivated by a desire
to increase Western influence in Ukraine at Moscow’s expense.  After a hasty
meeting with Kuchma in Moscow after the second round of the election, Putin
ridiculed the idea of a repeat of the second round.  After the Ukrainian Supreme
Court’s decision, Putin said on December 6 that he would work with any
democratically-elected Ukrainian leader, but then charged that Yushchenko was
trying to seize power by force.  At an OSCE foreign ministers’ meeting in Sofia,
Bulgaria on December 7, Russia blocked a statement supporting the Ukrainian
Supreme Court’s decision invalidating the election and calling for a new vote on
December 26.   Russian officials sharply criticized the political reform package
passed by the Ukrainian parliament on December 8.    
Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov attended the November 29 meeting of leaders
from Ukraine’s southern and eastern regions that called for autonomy in response to
a possible Yushenko victory.  He delivered a speech praising the group and harshly
denouncing Yushchenko.  Some observers assert that Luzhkov’s appearance at the
gathering may be a sign that Russia is willing to go so far as to appear to support
separatism in Ukraine in order to retain its influence there. 
Russia’s conduct during the political crisis in Ukraine could be crucial in
shaping Russia’s relations with the United States and most of the rest of Europe for
years to come. Many observers in Ukraine, Europe, and the United States see
Moscow’s actions in connection with the Ukrainian election and the subsequent
political crisis as an attempt by the Putin regime to reassert Russian dominance over
Ukraine.  Some critics of Russian policy are quick to point out that this Ukrainian
issue is not an isolated event.  They note Russia’s increased pressure on neighboring
Georgia and Moldova, where Moscow maintains military bases in defiance of those
governments’ oft-repeated demands for their withdrawal, and Russian support of
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7 Russia provides economic, political, and military support to the Abkhazian and South
Ossetian separatist movements in Georgia and to the self-proclaimed “Dniester Republic”
in Moldova. 
8 See for example, Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and
its Geostrategic Imperatives, Basic Books, N.Y., 1997.
9  “Putin To Respect New Ukraine Election — Germany,” Reuters, November 30, 2004.
armed separatist regimes there.7  They see this as an attempt to reestablish Russian
control on the territory of the former Soviet Union.  
Many of these critics also call attention to what they see as similarly disturbing
policies of President Putin inside Russia, such as: curtailing press freedom, especially
of the broadcast media; moving even beyond “managed democracy” toward a form
of “soft authoritarianism” thinly disguised by sham elections; and undermining free
markets by dismantling Yukos, one of Russia’s biggest, most important — and most
independent-minded — businesses, and threatening similar action against other
businesses that oppose the Kremlin.
Some observers view Russian intervention in Ukraine as a critical issue. They
believe that without Ukraine, Russia cannot be an empire; with Ukraine, Russia is
automatically an empire; and whether or not Russia is an empire is profoundly
important in shaping Russia’s own evolution, in its relations with its neighbors, and
also for the security interests of United States.8
European Union
The Presidency of the European Union, currently held by the Netherlands, and
the European Parliament rejected the second round results as fraudulent and
advocated a repeat election, even before one was ordered by Ukraine’s Supreme
Court.  The EU expressed this view during a November 25 EU-Russia summit
meeting with President Putin.  The European Union and some of its member
countries have played key roles in international efforts to broker a solution to the
political crisis.  After the second round, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder
reportedly tried during several telephone conversations with Putin to convince him
to support a new election in Ukraine.9  EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana, Polish
President Aleksandr Kwasniewski, and Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus have
served as mediators in several rounds of talks in Kiev with President Kuchma and
both candidates.  Russian State Duma speaker Boris Gryzlov and OSCE secretary
general Jan Kubis have also participated in the talks. 
U.S. Policy
The United States has warned Ukrainian leaders that Ukraine’s prospects for
Euro-Atlantic integration will be strongly influenced by whether Ukraine holds free
and fair presidential elections.  U.S. officials say the United States could work with
either major candidate, if he is elected fairly.  In an October 14 press statement, State
Department spokesman Richard Boucher said that the United States was “deeply
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14 Steve Holland, “Bush: Ukraine Should be Free of Foreign Influence,” Reuters news
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15 “Remarks at Stakeout at the Mayflower Hotel,” December 6, 2004, from the State
(continued...)
disappointed” that  the campaign fell short of international standards.  He warned that
the United States would reexamine its relationship with those engaged in election
fraud and manipulation.  On November 1,  State Department spokesman Adam Ereli
said that the United States agreed with the assessment of the OSCE observers that the
conduct of the first round of the vote fell short of democratic standards, noting
particularly flawed voter lists and arbitrary expulsion of electoral commissioners
shortly before the vote.
Senator Richard Lugar, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
monitored the November 21 runoff at the request of President Bush.  He said after
the vote that “it is now apparent that there was a concerted and forceful program of
election day fraud and abuse enacted with the leadership or cooperation of the
authorities.”  Senator Lugar said that he had carried a letter from President Bush to
President Kuchma that warned that a “tarnished election” will cause the United States
to “review” its relations with Ukraine.  Senator Lugar stressed that Kuchma “has the
responsibility and the opportunity for producing even at this point an outcome which
is fair and responsible.”10
President Bush and Administration officials issued sharp criticisms of the
conduct of the second round of the elections.  On November 24, Secretary of State
Colin Powell said that the United States could not accept the officially declared
election results as “legitimate” due to the “extensive and credible reports of fraud in
the election.” Powell called for a “full review of the conduct of the election and the
tallying of election results.”11  On November 26, President Bush said that the validity
of Ukraine’s elections was “in doubt” and warned that the “international community
is watching very carefully” how the Ukrainian government responds to “allegations
of vote fraud.”12  On November 29, Secretary Powell stressed in discussions with
Kuchma and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov U.S. support for a peaceful
solution to the crisis that respects Ukraine’s territorial integrity.  State Department
officials have expressed strong U.S. opposition to any separatist initiatives in
Ukraine.13 On December 2, President Bush added that “any election, if there is one,
ought to be free from any foreign influence. These elections ought to be open and
fair.”14 
Secretary of State Powell praised the Ukrainian Supreme Court’s decision to




issued statements strongly supporting the political reform package agreed to by
President Kuchma and the Ukrainian parliament on December 8.  U.S. spokesmen
also called for a thorough and transparent investigation of the alleged poisoning of
Yushchenko.
During a December 7 hearing before the House International Relations
Committee, John Tefft, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and
Eurasian Affairs, detailed U.S. efforts to promote free and fair elections in Ukraine.
He said that election-related assistance amounted to about $13.8 million.  The aid
included support for independent media, non-partisan political party training, voter
education, training for election officials and observers.  The United States funded
anti-fraud efforts such as independent exit polling and parallel vote counts.  The
United States also provided financial support for OSCE and other election observers.
Tefft also announced that the Administration had submitted a Congressional
Notification for an additional $3 million for the December 26 repeat vote, including
$0.5 million for OSCE observers and $2.5 million for NGO monitoring and other
election-related activities.  
U.S. Policy Issues
It seems likely that, given a fairer electoral process than in the first two rounds,
Yushchenko will win the repeat presidential election on December 26.  One
important issue for U.S. policy will be whether the United States should increase
bilateral aid and lending from international financial institutions and offer other
forms of support to the new leadership.   Such U.S. assistance, and similar assistance
and support from the EU, could be important to consolidating the gains of democratic
forces in Ukraine in the run-up to the March 2006 parliamentary elections, which
have assumed even greater importance due to the political reforms adopted as part
of the solution to Ukraine’s political crisis.   
Another important issue for U.S. policymakers is the possible impact of
Ukraine’s political crisis on Ukraine’s troop deployment to Iraq.  U.S. officials said
before the presidential election that Ukraine’s contribution of 1,600 troops, while
appreciated, would not cause the United States to overlook Ukraine’s democratic
shortcomings.  However, some observers were concerned that Ukrainian leaders were
hoping that the United States would downplay election irregularities if Ukraine
continued its troop deployment in Iraq.   During the campaign, Yushchenko pledged
to withdraw the troops if elected. Yanukovych has supported the deployment, but has
raised the possibility that a continued deployment could be conditioned on such
factors as whether Ukraine receives more reconstruction contracts in Iraq.
On December 3, the Ukrainian parliament approved a non-binding resolution
calling on President Kuchma to withdraw Ukraine’s contingent from Iraq.  The
resolution was supported by pro-regime members, as well as a few pro-Yushchenko
groups and the Socialist and Communist factions.  The move may be intended by the
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regime as a warning to the United States to temper its perceived support for
Yushchenko.
There is also the issue of the impact of Ukraine’s political crisis on relations
between the United States and Russia.  Some observers have questioned whether the
United States, in hopes of fostering a good bilateral relationship with Moscow, has
overlooked longstanding Russian rhetoric and actions aimed at consolidating a
Russian sphere of influence over many of the Soviet successor states such as Georgia,
Moldova, Belarus, and now Ukraine.  They say that an alleged reluctance by the
United States to strongly criticize Putin’s own increasing authoritarianism at home
may have also encouraged Moscow to believe that the United States would not try
to stop his efforts to support similar “managed democracies” in neighboring
countries.   
In response, Administration officials have noted that they have firmly rejected
Russian accusations of U.S. interference in Ukraine’s internal affairs, saying the issue
is one of democracy in Ukraine, not alleged geopolitical competition between Russia
and the West.  They say that publicly raising Ukraine as an issue in overall U.S.-
Russian relations would not help resolve the issue, and could hurt U.S.-Russian
cooperation on vital issues such as the global war on terror.16  
Congressional Action
Congress has considered legislation on the Ukrainian elections.  On July 22,
2004, the Senate passed S. Con. Res.106 by unanimous consent. The resolution,
introduced by Senator Campbell,  notes the violations against OSCE standards for
free and fair elections that have taken place during past elections and during the
present Ukrainian election campaign.  The resolution pledges Congress’s support for
Ukraine’s establishment of democracy, free markets, and a place in the Western
community of democracies.   H.Con.Res. 415, introduced by Representative Hyde,
was passed by the House on October 4.  It is identical to S.Con.Res. 106, except that
it adds two clauses that “strongly encourage” the President to fully employ U.S.
government resources to ensure a free and fair election and to stress to the Ukrainian
government that the conduct of the elections will be “a central factor in determining
the future relationship between the two countries.”
Representative Rohrabacher introduced H.R. 5102 on September 15, 2004.  The
bill details the failures of the Ukrainian government to uphold democratic standards
in the past and during the present campaign, and calls on it to ensure that a free and
fair election takes place.  However, it also includes provisions for sanctions on
Ukrainian leaders and the Ukrainian government if the U.S. president does not certify
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that Ukraine has implemented free and fair elections, and stopped harassment of the
opposition, independent media and other groups.  The President would have the
authority to waive the sanctions if he certifies that it is in the “national security
interest of the United States” to do so.  The bill would require a report from the
President on the personal assets of the Ukrainian leadership and on whether Ukraine
has supplied weapons or weapons-related technologies to regimes supporting
terrorism.  Representative Rohrabacher introduced a modified version of the bill on
October 7 as H.R. 5247.  A companion Senate bill, S. 2957, was introduced by
Senator Kyl on October 8.
On November 18, the Senate passed S.Res. 473 by unanimous consent. As in
the case of H.Con.Res. 415, it warns Ukrainian leaders against conducting a
fraudulent election.  However, it goes further than H.Con.Res. 415 in that it “strongly
encourages” the Administration to impose sanctions, including visa bans, against
those encouraging or participating in fraud.
On December 7, 2004, the House International Relations Committee held a
hearing on the Ukrainian elections.  The witnesses were Senator Lugar,
Representative Kaptur (co-chair of the House Ukrainian Caucus), and John Tefft,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs.
